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Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx
Dallas Burtraw, David A. Evans, Alan Krupnick, Karen Palmer, and Russell Toth 
Abstract 
For years economists have urged policymakers to use market-based approaches such as cap-and-
trade programs or emission taxes to control pollution. The SO2 allowance market created by Title 
IV of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments represents the first real test of the wisdom of 
economists’ advice. Subsequent urban and regional applications of NOx emission allowance 
trading took shape in the 1990s in the United States, culminating in a second large experiment in 
emission trading in the eastern United States that began in 2003. This paper provides an overview 
of the economic rationale for emission trading and a description of the major U.S. programs for 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). We evaluate these programs along measures of 
performance including cost savings, environmental integrity, and incentives for technological 
innovation. We offer lessons for the design of future programs including, most importantly, those 
reducing carbon dioxide. 
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Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx  
Dallas Burtraw, David A. Evans, Alan Krupnick, Karen Palmer, and Russell Toth∗
1. Introduction 
State and federal governments have made significant progress toward improving air 
quality. However, attainment of the national ambient air quality standards remains elusive, 
especially for fine particulate matter and ground level ozone, one of the main components of 
“smog,” and for reversing the ecological effects of acidification. 
Air emissions from electricity generators are a major contributor to these pollution 
problems, including sulfur dioxide (SO2) —which contributes to acid rain and fine particle 
concentrations in the atmosphere—and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which contribute to both of these 
pollution problems and to ground-level ozone. The electricity sector emits roughly 68 percent of 
national SO2 and 22 percent of NOx.1 The effects of the emissions of SO2 are particularly strong 
in the Northeast, which is upwind of the large number of coal-fired generators located in the 
Mid-Atlantic States and the Ohio Valley. NOx emissions also affect the Northeast but have a 
relatively bigger effect in western states. 
Emission trading is now the centerpiece of federal policy towards control of SO2 and 
NOx. The year 2004 marked the 10
th year of the national cap-and-trade program for SO2 
emissions from electricity generators established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (CAAA). That same year saw the full implementation of a summer seasonal 
trading in NOx emission allowances in the eastern 19 state NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) 
Call region. NOx trading has also been used in Los Angeles and the surrounding region to help 
combat ozone problems.  
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This paper analyzes the use of the cap-and-trade approach in regulating SO2 and NOx 
emissions from electricity generators in the United States and considers four questions:  
•  Has cap and trade worked well in reducing emissions, improving environmental quality 
and doing so at relatively low cost? What are the key features of a cap-and-trade program 
that worked and what features were less successful? 
•  To what extent have the pollution problems that SO2 and NOX emission trading programs 
were designed to address been solved? 
•  If these problems are not yet solved, is a cap-and-trade approach still the best strategy for 
achieving further reductions in SO2 and NOx? 
•  What are the lessons for using a cap and trade approach to control emissions of other 
pollutants such as mercury and carbon dioxide (CO2)? 
After some general background information on the economics of emission trading and a 
short review of the related economics literature, the remainder of the paper is divided into two 
halves. The first half focuses on SO2 and the second half on NOx. The penultimate section of the 
paper is a summary of new initiatives to expand the use of emission trading, both under new 
stricter caps for SO2 and NOx and for other pollutants. The final section concludes with a 
summary of lessons learned.  
2. The Foundations of Emission Trading 
The first discussion of the use of economic instruments in environmental policy was from 
the British economist Pigou, suggesting the use of emissions fees or taxes as a way to internalize 
into private decisions the environmental costs of pollution (Pigou 1920). Emission trading was 
identified as an alternative far later by North American economists. Crocker (1966) proposed the 
idea of the government setting a cap on aggregate emissions and letting the market determine the 
emission price and the degree of abatement at individual facilities, rather than having the 
government set the price through an emission fee. Dales (1968) popularized the idea. 
One can illustrate the simple underpinnings of emission trading by considering a control 
policy in the context of two facilities where the benefit of abating emissions at each facility is 
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identical and equal to $1,000 per ton.2 The cost of abating a level of emissions, Ai, at facility i is 
represented by the function  , where i=1,2. Imagine that the cost of achieving a particular 
quantity of abatement (
() ii CA
A) at facility 1 is different from the cost of achieving that quantity at 
facility 2, that is  12 ()    C () CA A ≠ . Assume also that it gets harder and harder for each of the 
facilities to reduce emission, that is, the cost per ton of abatement rises at an increasing rate. This 
is represented as positive first and second derivatives of the cost functions: 
 
'' ' () 0 , () 0 , f o r 1 , 2 . ii CA CA i >> =
Presuming the environmental planner wishes to maximize the social net benefit  
of abatement—that is, benefits minus costs of abatement—we can represent the planner’s 
problem as: 
[ ]
12 ,1 2 1 1 2 max 1000 ( ) ( ) AA AA C A C A +− − 2
                                                
. 
The mathematical solution requires that ; that is, social net benefit is 
maximized when the marginal cost of abatement at each of the facilities equals the marginal 
benefit of abatement. The marginal abatement cost,  , is that cost associated with reducing 
an additional increment of pollution, while the marginal benefit, in this example a constant 
$1,000, is the additional benefit of reducing that increment. In order to obtain the greatest 
aggregate social benefit, the above solution implies that the actual quantity of emission 
reductions at each facility may be different. It also implies that the marginal abatement cost of 
facility 1 must equal the marginal cost at facility 2. This is the cost-effectiveness element of the 
optimal solution. For the social net benefit of abatement to be maximized, it follows that the 
actual abatement achieved must be realized at the least cost to society. This realization occurs 
when the marginal abatement costs across all facilities are equated. 
''
11 22 ( ) ( ) 1,000 CA CA ==
( ) ii CA
An emission trading policy can achieve this solution, assuming that the affected facility 
have an incentive to minimize the cost of abatement. Suppose the marginal abatement cost of 
facility 1 is higher than the marginal abatement cost of facility 2. There exists some price per ton 
that facility 1 would be willing to pay facility 2 to increase its abatement so that facility 1 can 
lower its abatement while keeping total abatement constant. Facility 1 is better off because price 
it pays is less than the cost of abatement. Facility 2 is also better off because the cost of the 
additional abatement it must achieve is less than the price it receives from facility 1. Emission 
 
2 For more general discussions on the economics of pollution control see Tietenberg (1985), Baumol and Oates 
(1988), and Klaassen (1994).  
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allowances (alternatively called permits) are the currency that facilitates this trade while 
protecting the environmental integrity of the program. An emission allowance is a legal and 
transferable right to emit a certain quantity of emissions (ounce, pound, ton, etc.). While they 
represent a right to emit, sources have an obligation to hold emission allowances equivalent to 
their total emissions in a particular compliance period (year, month, etc.). Emission allowances 
expire after use. To reduce costs, operators of affected facilities can buy and sell emission 
allowances. This incentive to trade allowances exists between the two facilities until their 
marginal abatement costs are equal. 
The key feature of emissions trading is that allowing regulated facilities to transfer 
emission allowances should lead to a distribution of emission reductions that equates the 
marginal cost of emission reductions among facilities and therefore minimizes the total costs of 
emission reductions. Identification of the efficient level of emissions requires potentially 
extensive and uncertain information about the benefits and costs under any approach to 
regulation. However, once policymakers identify an environmental target, emission trading 
promises a cost-effective way to achieve that target and requires little information of the 
regulator. If a market is established for emission allowances, and if the regulator can monitor 
emissions to ensure that the aggregate emission target is achieved, then the regulator does not 
need information about the cost functions of individual facilities.  
Most environmental regulations in the United States apply a uniform policy to sources of 
the same pollutant in the same industry. Often these policies require all sources to achieve the 
same maximum emission rate or use a particular abatement technology. This has been described 
as the command-and-control method of regulation. Such a prescriptive regulatory approach 
aimed at achieving the cost-effective outcome allowance trading achieves would impose a 
significantly greater informational burden on the government, given the different scales, 
vintages, and unique production techniques used by the affected sources. 
The first application of emission trading was developed by economists and policy 
analysts in EPA’s Regulatory Reform group in 1975–76 who sought a way to permit localities 
violating the air quality health standards to support economic development without further 
increasing emissions. To accomplish this they designed a system of emission offsets whereby 
new emitting sources could pay existing sources to reduce their emissions sufficiently to offset 
any increase in emissions. Under this program, the local government could find emission 
reductions among its existing sources and provide them or sell them to newly established 
businesses, thereby offsetting emissions increases with reductions elsewhere. This approach 
featured bilateral trades and no aggregate cap on emissions. The government had to approve 
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every transaction and often mediated these transactions, so it was far from the current emission 
trading model for SO2 and NOx. Nevertheless, emission offsets provided a way for to localities 
experiencing economic growth to avoid being constrained by clean air requirements. Variations 
on this theme including the “bubble” policy, whereby one could imagine placing a bubble over 
the multiple emission stacks of a plant and permit emissions of a particular type to be traded, 
(more precisely, allocated) among these stacks. EPA remained concerned only about the 
aggregate emissions from the metaphorical bubble. Bubbles could also cover smokestacks from 
multiple, if co-located, facilities. In the 1977 CAAA, Congress recognized the offset policy in 
law and also made it possible to “bank” emission reductions for later use. 
A fully developed allowance trading policy encompasses many facilities and firms, and 
consequently complicated environmental considerations become relevant. For instance, imagine 
that the benefit per ton of emission reductions varies for each facility. To illustrate, imagine the 
marginal benefit per ton of abatement at facility 1 is $1,500, and the marginal benefit at facility 2 
is $1,000. To maximize the social net benefit one can solve the problem:  
[ ] [ ]
12 ,1 1 1 2 2 max 1500 ( ) 1000 ( ) AA AC A AC A −+ − 2
                                                
. 
The mathematical solution requires that  . In other 
words, net benefits are maximized when the amount of abatement and the marginal cost of 
abatement vary at the two facilities. A parallel interpretation with subscripts indicating time 
periods instead of facilities would indicate that emission reductions at different times of day or 
times of year could be more or less valuable. The optimal structure for an emissions trading 
program will be altered if pollutants are not uniformly mixing in space or if emissions reduction 
at certain points in time are more valuable than at others. Montgomery (1972) established that if 
pollutants are not uniformly mixing in the atmosphere but instead the location of emissions 
matters to their environmental impact a system of emission allowances could be replaced with a 
system of allowances governing ambient air quality at receptor locations and the markets, one for 
each receptor, would in theory achieve the efficient outcome. Under an ambient allowance 
system, facilities would obtain and trade allowances that account for the impact of their 
emissions at each location.3  
''
11 22 1,500 ( ) and 1,000 ( ) CA CA ==
 
3 Tietenberg (1985) provides theoretical background and recorded evidence on hot spot issues in early trading 
programs, both with regards to the spatial dimension (pp. 60–92), and the temporal dimension (pp. 149–167). See 
also Tietenberg (1995), Krumm and Wellsich (1995), and Swift (2000a). Klaassen and Amann (1994) summarize 
alternative means by which spatial constraints can be incorporated into a system of tradable permits. 
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However, an ambient allowance system could be administratively complex, and 
enforcement would impose a substantially greater informational burden on the regulator, 
including the evaluation of the environmental effects of emissions from different locations. 
Simplified alternatives to ambient allowance trading that have been suggested include 
geographic allowance trading zones and the use of trading ratios between emission sources that 
reflect environmental effects (Tietenberg 1985; Krupnick et al. 1983).4
Where do trading programs for SO2 and NOx fit when considering the realistic details of 
this nature? Both pollutants exhibit complex temporal characteristics. SO2 and NOx lead to 
changes in fine particulates that affect human health in the near term and also contribute to long-
term acidification. NOx emissions also contribute to the formation of ground-level ozone, which 
is primarily a seasonal daytime problem of an episodic nature. Further, the environmental 
consequences of both types of emissions have complicated geographic impacts that depend on 
their location. However, as will be described below, SO2 and NOx emission trading programs in 
the United States have for the most part ignored spatial and temporal details in their design to 
focus instead on achieving the greatest aggregate amount of emission reductions. A focus of this 
review is whether the simple design of a cap-and-trade program, with or without spatial or 
temporal constraints, is in fact a wise policy choice for regulating SO2 and NOx and whether it is 
an appropriate model for regulating other pollutants. 
3. Regulatory History of SO2
SO2 and its derivative pollutants are ubiquitous threats to public health and the 
environment. Given its potentially direct effect on human health, gaseous SO2 emissions are 
regulated as a criteria air pollutant.5 Today, the largest threat of SO2 to public health is its role as 
a precursor to secondary particulates, a constituent of particulate matter, which is another criteria 
air pollutant. SO2 and particulate matter are associated with human morbidity and mortality. 
                                                 
4 At least two other seminal concerns have emerged regarding the efficiency of emission permits. One is how 
uncertainty affects the design of regulation and the choice between emission fees and emission permits (Weitzman 
1974). Another is the way that permit trading interacts with preexisting taxes and other regulations in the economy 
(Goulder and Williams 2003). 
5 Criteria air pollutants are those for which there are maximum ambient concentrations that all localities are 
expected not to exceed.  
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To help alleviate the contribution of SO2 emissions to local air quality problems in the 
1970s, utility companies constructed 429 tall stacks, many over 500 feet, on coal-fired boilers 
(Regens and Rycroft 1988). As a consequence, the vast majority of urban areas in the 1980s 
attained the national ambient air quality standards for SO2. However, the smokestack remedy to 
local problems contributed to the deterioration of air quality at a regional level. Released high in 
the atmosphere, SO2 emissions from coal plants travel hundreds of miles and convert to sulfates 
that, as particulates, degrade air quality and damage human health and visibility.  
Furthermore, the elevated emissions have led to deposition of sulfuric compounds in soils 
and waterways in regions distant from the source of emissions. More commonly known as acid 
rain, deposition of sulfur compounds contributes to acidification of forests and lakes. NOx 
emissions behave similarly and also contribute to acid rain.6 Although secondary particulates and 
acid rain are national problems, they are most severe in the eastern United States. Most of the 
nation’s high-sulfur coal is from the Appalachians and burned primarily east of the Mississippi 
River. Weather patterns move emissions farther to the east. 
The 1970 Clean Air Act implemented performance standards for new sources, as well as 
for those that undertook major modification, based on emissions per unit of heat input. 
Collectively, these standards are known as new source performance standards (NSPS).7 Since 
1977 new coal-fired power plants have faced an emissions rate–based standard that effectively 
required the installation of flue gas desulfurization systems commonly referred to as “scrubbers.” 
Although the emission limitation is nominally a performance standard, operators of new facilities 
cannot switch to low-sulfur coal to achieve comparable emission reductions, and the only 
technology available to meet the standard for either low- or high-sulfur coal is scrubbing. 
The NSPS are seen as a way to improve environmental performance over time as older 
plants eventually retire. However, the power plants that existed before 1978 seem to have an 
almost indefinite life (Ellerman 1998). Prior to the 1990 CAAA, federal clean air policy treated 
new and existing coal-fired facilities unevenly, and many argue the NSPS has given a cost 
                                                 
6 Of the two contributors to acid precipitation, SO2 is considered the more significant because most affected regions 
still have the capacity to buffer excess nitrogen. In the future, NOx emissions may rise in significance, depending on 
the region’s soil characteristics. See discussion in U.S. EPA 1995a.  
7 The actual emission reduction standards imposed on new plants or plants that undergo major modifications will be 
at least as stringent as the NSPS and often more stringent. Emission reduction requirements are typically determined 
on a case-by-case basis. 
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advantage to existing sources that has lengthened their life (Nelson et al. 1993). The 1990 CAAA 
bridged this gap by regulating SO2 emissions from all new and existing power plants in a 
uniform manner, although NSPS remain in effect for new plants. 
4. Design of Title IV SO2 Trading Program 
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments regulates emissions of SO2 from 
electricity-generating facilities under an emission trading program in order to reduce damages 
from acidification. The industry is allocated a fixed number of allowances, and firms are required 
to surrender one allowance for each ton of SO2 emitted by their plants. Firms may transfer 
allowances among facilities or to other firms or bank them for use in future years.  
A less widely acknowledged innovation of Title IV is the annual cap on average 
aggregate emissions by electricity generators. Unlike prescriptive technology-based approaches 
to environmental regulation, under which emissions are allowed to increase with economic 
growth, a central feature of the cap-and-trade approach is that emissions are fixed and it is the 
allowance price that fluctuates. However, the SO2 program allows an affected source to retain for 
future use allowances allocated to a facility in excess of its emissions. That is, sources are 
allowed to bank allowances, such that in any year aggregate industry emissions must be equal to 
or less than the number of allowances allocated for the year plus the surplus accrued from 
previous years.  
The law assigns allowances to each affected power plant unit based on its heat input 
during a historical base period (1985–1987), multiplied by an emissions rate calculated such  
that aggregated emissions equal the target emissions cap. Industrial sources are excluded  
from the mandatory program, but they may voluntarily enroll after establishing a historical 
emissions profile. 
Under Title IV, the annual SO2 allowance allocations are ultimately to be capped at 8.95 
million tons. Annual emissions will average this level by about 2010 when it is expected that the 
emission bank will be depleted. The cap is approximately 10 million tons less than the amount 
emitted by utility facilities in 1980. Reductions to achieve the 8.95 million ton cap took place in 
two phases. Phase I began in 1995 and affected the 110 dirtiest coal-fired electricity-generating 
facilities including about 374 generating units. Virtually all of the Phase I units are located east 
of the Mississippi River. Phase II started in 2000 and covered all other coal-fired electricity-
generating facilities with a capacity greater than 25 megawatts, plus smaller ones using fuel with 
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a relatively high sulfur content, totaling about 1,420 generating units. In addition, the allocation 
to Phase I sources was reduced by slightly over half at the onset of Phase II.  
Originally the SO2 trading program was designed with two regions, one in the east and 
one in the west, to ensure that emissions were adequately reduced where damages from 
acidification were the most severe—in the east. Ultimately, the two-region model was abandoned 
and replaced by an SO2 market with a single national cap, largely because the single-market 
approach was expected to result in greater cost savings from allowance trading (Hausker 1992). 
The ability to bank allowances without restriction proved valuable to the political success 
of the program. Once firms had built up a bank of unused allowances, they had a vested interest 
in maintaining the value of those banked credits and thus in furthering the program itself. 
5. Measures of Effectiveness for SO2 Trading  
The effectiveness of the SO2 trading program can be measured in a number of ways 
including emission reductions and effects on environmental quality, performance of the market, 
effects on the cost of compliance and the implications of the trading program for technological 
change. 
5.1. Emission Reductions  
Title IV has produced substantial declines in power plant SO2 emissions over the past 10 
years. During Phase I of the program, SO2 emissions fell dramatically relative to previous levels 
and also fell (although somewhat less dramatically) relative to levels that likely would have been 
obtained in the absence of Title IV (Ellerman et al. 2000). Total emissions in 1995, the first year 
of the program, were 11.87 million tons—25% below 1990 levels and more than 35% below 
1980 levels. Although emissions from the Phase I units remained relatively flat between 1995 
and 1999, emissions at the unconstrained Phase II plants rose causing total emissions to climb up 
to 13.1 million tons in 1998 and 12.5 million tons in 1999. 
Total emissions from affected units were well below annual allocations throughout the 
Phase I period. The opportunity for units to voluntarily participate in Phase I is thought to have 
introduced adverse-selection leading to an increase in emissions of one to two million tons 
(Montero 1999). However, the unused allowances yielded a bank totaling nearly 11.6 million 
allowances by the end of Phase I.  
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During the first year of Phase II in 2000, total SO2 emissions declined to 11.2 million 
tons-almost 40% below 1980 levels. Units that came into the program in Phase II account for the 
majority of allowances allocated in Phase II and the majority of electricity generation. However, 
they contributed less emission reduction than the “large, dirty” units regulated under Phase I. 
Ellerman (2003) estimates that five-sixths of the reduction in SO2 emissions from a projected 
baseline in 2001 occurred at Phase I units. He finds that as a group these units have reduced 
emissions by 57%, while Phase II units have reduced them by 14% to date.  
In 2002, total emissions from the sources affected by the SO2 program declined farther to 
10.2 million tons. They fluctuated up to 10.6 million tons in 2003, in part due to high natural  
gas prices and a decline in the availability of nuclear units. In Phase II emissions have exceeded 
the annual allowance allocations by between 1 and 1.5 million tons each year as utilities draw 
down the bank built up in Phase I. Emissions are expected to continue to be above the annual  
cap through the remainder of this decade as they gradually decline to the 8.95 million ton  
annual target. Nonetheless, despite drawdown of the allowance bank over the decade,  
emissions are expected to be substantially below the levels predicted in the absence of Title IV 
(U.S. EPA 2001). 
5.2. The Environment 
Two environmental pathways are especially important in assessing the effects of SO2 
emissions changes. One is the change in airborne particulate matter formed by SO2. The public 
health benefits from the emission reductions have been widely cited in pointing to the program’s 
success. The second is the reduction in acid deposition. Although public health and ecological 
measures are primarily affected by the level of the aggregate emission cap, another important 
question is how trading per se has affected these measures.  
5.2.1. Environmental Response 
Changes in emissions of SO2 are thought to have had the greatest economic impact 
through improvements in human health. The ex post public health response has not yet been 
measured, but changes in particulate concentrations have been measured and simulation models 
suggest dramatic improvements in public health that outweigh costs by over an order of 
magnitude (U.S. EPA 2001). 
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The main ecological concern about SO2 emissions is acidification.8 Environmental 
improvements associated with the decline in emissions are evident but the problems of 
acidification remain. Several researchers have observed decreases in sulfur deposition and, to a 
lesser extent, decreases in sulfate concentrations in surface waters during the 1990s (Stoddard et 
al. 1998, Driscoll et al. 1995, Driscoll et al. 2001). Indeed, a steady drop in sulfur deposition has 
occurred since the 1970s, due to implementation of new source performance standards after the 
1970 Clean Air Act (Stoddard et al. 1998, Driscoll et al. 1995). However, ecological recovery is 
a slow process.9 In the Northeast—with attention focused on the Adirondacks in particular—the 
change in deposition has led to observable changes in sulfur in streams and, with some delay, is 
expected to result in changes in acid neutralizing capacity. The southeast region has older soil 
and the solution will take even longer. While the ecosystem health of the Adirondacks is now 
relatively stable, in large parts of the southeast aquatic ecosystems are expected to continue to 
decline absent further reductions in acid deposition (Stoddard et al. 2003; Sullivan et al. 2004). 
5.2.2. Environmental Hotspots 
Environmental hotspots are spikes in pollution at specific locations or in specific time 
periods. Conceptually, such outcomes are possible if as a result of trading a high portion of 
allowances is used at a small number of facilities. Further, it is possible that particulate levels in 
some locations resulting from long-range transport of SO2 could increase. Mixed in with concern 
over hotspots is concern about “environmental justice” and that the hotspots will be in 
impoverished or minority communities.  
The economic logic of emission trading suggests that it should not generally lead to 
hotspots. It is reasonable to expect that the largest, dirtiest facilities should be able to reduce 
emissions most easily (that is, they should have relatively low marginal abatement costs) and 
hence emissions trading might lead to a “cooling” effect whereby the greatest reductions are in 
the areas most adversely affected historically from power plant emissions. In addition, massive 
reductions in aggregate emissions accomplished under the Title IV regulations should enable an 
overall welfare benefit that far outweighs incidental hotspot activity. Further, trades of SO2 at a 
                                                 
8 SO2 emissions also affect visibility and damage materials. 
9 Replenishment of base cations, a key component in the recovery of acid neutralizing capacity and ultimately of 
ecological recovery, will occur principally through mineral weathering of the bedrock, which takes anywhere from 
decades to centuries. Particulate emissions from industrial sources have been reduced thereby reducing the 
atmospheric deposition of base cations to watersheds. 
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national level cannot legally lead to violations of local ambient air quality standards for SO2 
because emission sources must comply with local standards as well as with the national 
aggregate cap-and-trade program. Yet, it is possible that emissions could increase in a local area 
if the area remains in attainment of air quality standards. 
It is important to recognize that the cost savings associated with a trading program may 
enable greater emission reductions in the aggregate, which may outweigh small changes due to 
trading. Hahn and Stavins (1991) note that early emission reduction credit programs that predate 
the SO2 cap-and-trade program were typically a translation of an existing prescriptive program 
into a trading program with limited associated gains for environmental quality.10 In contrast, the 
SO2 trading program incorporated a dramatic reduction in aggregate emissions and thereby 
offered gains to the environment, a point that has been very important in building political 
support for it. Kete (1992) indicates that the “cap with trading” approach of Title IV closed the 
political gap between proposals from industry that called for an 8 million ton reduction and from 
environmentalists that called for a 12 million ton reduction, yielding a compromise that 
accomplished roughly a 10 million ton reduction.  
Given an aggregate level of emissions to be achieved under one type of policy or another, 
several authors have asked whether trading creates hot spots. Solomon and Lee (2000) argue that 
unfettered trading in a single national market is a mistake because it fails to adequately protect 
sensitive areas in the Northeast, particularly in New York State. This contradicts early forecasts 
of the effects of SO2 trading by the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (U.S. 
NAPAP 1991). That study considered a fixed level of aggregate emissions and illustrated 
potential changes in emissions and deposition that could result from trading compared with an 
emissions rate standard at 120 facilities with the highest emissions rates. They found that trading 
would lead to no change or a slight reduction in sulfur deposition in the East (pg. 447), and 
slightly higher to moderately lower levels of deposition among all states (pg. 256). 
Burtraw and Mansur (1999) model the effects of allowance trading and banking under the 
SO2 program in greater detail and also find that trading could be expected to lead to reductions in 
deposition in the East compared to a no-trading baseline with aggregate emissions held constant. 
They also find a reduction in the concentration of airborne particulate matter, although the 
                                                 
10 The offset programs did require ratios such that 1.3 tons at existing sources would be avoided for every new ton 
produced. Controversy surrounded the authenticity of the emission reductions. 
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changes were inconsequential compared to the improvements achieved by the reduction in 
overall emissions.  
Other research has also supported the theoretical expectation that emission trading should 
lead to a cooling of hotspots. U.S. EPA (1998a) shows that sellers and ultimate buyers of SO2 
allowances in Phase I tended to be located within 200 miles of each other, thereby minimizing 
the potential for geographic impacts. Swift (2000b) presents evidence supporting the notion that 
the largest, dirtiest plants clean up the most. With plants arranged in quartiles, the largest plants 
reduced emissions 24% below allocation on average, and the smallest reduced by 6%. Swift also 
argues that hotspot issues are likely to be unimportant relative to costs savings because from 
1994–1998 interregional trades constituted only 3% of the total value of all trades. Swift also 
points out that there have been areas, such as Midwest states like Ohio, where allowances have 
been purchased from nonattainment regions that would lead to a decline in emissions in these 
areas. Furthermore Swift argues that differences in regulatory methods such as trading versus 
command-and-control are related far less to localized pollution levels than to factors including 
plant location, size, and utilization, which would collectively determine over 90% of localized 
pollution levels. 
Swift (2004) finds that during Phase I of the program the greatest reductions in emissions 
by far (in tonnage and percentage) were in the Midwest, and cooling was the general result in 
practice. Phase II of the program has also produced encouraging results, although emissions by 
some facilities in the East have exceeded annual allocations due to withdrawal of banked 
allowances. It is notable that for a few western power plants, many of which have cheap access 
to low-sulfur Powder River Basin coal, emissions actually ended up above their baseline level, 
although below allocation levels that were calculated on the basis of projected growth in 
electricity generation. 
Not all analysts agree with these findings. Shadbegian, Gray, and Morgan (2004) 
examine the health costs and benefits associated with Title IV within the market-based system 
compared to a command-and-control alternative. As in other studies they find estimated public 
health benefits of reduced SO2 emissions under Title IV greatly exceed the costs and benefits 
from Title IV to be concentrated in the northeastern, north central, and southeastern states. 
However, they find that that low-income populations received slightly lower benefits on average 
from Title IV, raising environmental justice concerns, although predominately black and 
Hispanic communities received a disproportionately large share of benefits relative to their costs. 
They also find many facilities where emission reductions produce a larger net benefit (e.g. health 
and environmental benefits minus compliance cost) than were buyers of allowances (thus 
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emitting more than their initial allocation). A US GAO study (2002) also provides some a critical 
view by projecting that although total emissions will decrease by about 2 million tons by 2020, 
in some parts of the United States there could be an increase due to emission trading. 
In summary the hotspot issue remains an important consideration in the design of an 
emission trading program. The evidence from the SO2 program is ambiguous. The geographic 
effects of trading may or may not be beneficial; however, clearly the geographic effects are very 
small compared to the aggregate benefits resulting from the reduction in overall emissions and 
probably are outweighed by the additional emission reductions afforded by trading compared to 
a more prescriptive command-and-control approach.  
5.3. The SO2 Allowance Market 
The volume of SO2 allowance trades has been significant. In the first three years of the 
SO2 program the volume of trades between economically distinct parties roughly doubled each 
year compared to the previous year, suggesting a process of learning on the part of firms (Kruger 
and Dean 1997). The volume of interfirm trading peaked in 2000 at just under 15 million 
allowances and has declined each year since. In 2003, roughly 8 million SO2 allowances were 
transferred between economically unrelated parties. 
The path of allowance prices illustrated in Figure 1 tells a story about the evolution of the 
market. The price of an allowance started at close to $150 per ton and fell to about $70 by early 
1996. Thereafter prices followed an upward path through 2003 at an efficient rate of increase that 
corresponded roughly to the opportunity cost of holding emission allowances in the bank 
(Ellerman 2003; Carlson et al 2000; Schennach 2000). During 1999, prices temporarily jumped 
to above $200 per ton, due in part to planning for Phase II and to changes in the status of the 
Clinton administration’s efforts to tighten the particulate matter ambient health standard. Prices 
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However, by the end of 2004 prices had risen to $700, due to an increase in demand for coal-
fired generation in response to an increase in natural gas prices and in electricity demand. Also 
the Bush administration has made clear that restrictions on emissions of greenhouse gases would 
not be imposed in the near future. Meanwhile the administration proposal for new regulations 
would raise the value of banked allowances. 
 

















5.4. Economic Performance 
A variety of analyses have shown that trading has led to significant cost savings. In this 
section we review the estimates of cost savings and why estimates of cost savings have evolved. 
Subsequently we ask whether the market has led firms to achieve the least-cost solution. In other 
words, is the market efficient?  
5.4.1. Cost Savings 
One frequently cited measure of the SO2 allowance market’s success has been the 
observation that allowance prices are substantially lower than EPA and others predicted at the 
time the program was adopted. However, if used as a proxy for cost, the difference between 
forecasts and reality is exaggerated (Smith et al. 1998). One reason is that changes in fuel 
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markets, including the decline in the delivered cost of low-sulfur coal and in the price of natural 
gas and oil in the 1990s contributed to a decline in emissions that would have occurred to some 
degree in the absence of Title IV. This led to a decline in the marginal cost of compliance, which 
set the price of allowances in the market.  
A number of studies have directly measured the cost savings attributable to allowance 
trading by comparing total costs under trading with a hypothetical counterfactual policy that 
would have been adopted in the absence of the program. Intentionally missing is consideration of 
the influence of other potential regulatory actions, such as further control of particulates or NOx 
emissions, or actions to address global warming. These studies consider an “enlightened” 
command and control approach (an emissions rate standard) as the alternative to trading. In 
reality, the alternative may have been less flexible and more expensive. For example, legislative 
approaches to controlling SO2 seriously considered in the mid-1980s included forced scrubbing 
at larger facilities.  
Most studies (Burtraw et al. 1998; White 1997; ICF 1995, 1990; White et al. 1995; GAO 
1994; Van Horn Consulting et al. 1993) employ engineering-based estimates of compliance 
options and their costs. In contrast, Carlson et al. (2000) provide economic estimates that rely on 
a simulation model based on marginal abatement cost functions derived from an econometrically 
estimated long-run total cost function for electricity generation for a sample  
of more than 800 generating units from 1985 to 1994. From an economic perspective, this 
approach is superior to an engineering cost model because it takes into account substitution 
among inputs in response to changes in relative input prices. Moreover, it captures actual 
observed behavior of firms. 
Carlson et al. estimate that the potential cost savings attributable to formal emissions 
trading, compared with the counterfactual of a uniform emissions rate standard, were $250 
million (1995$) during Phase I of the program. They estimate the savings to be $784 million per 
year during Phase II, or about 43% of total compliance costs under a uniform standard regulating 
the rate of emissions at a facility. When compared with an alternative counterfactual policy that 
forces scrubbing to achieve the same level of emissions, cost savings of the program are 
estimated to be almost $1.6 billion per year.  
Keohane (2002) uses econometric techniques to simulate decisions that would have been 
made under prescriptive SO2 regulation and finds that the total number of scrubbers would have 
been one-third higher under a uniform emissions-rate standard chosen to achieve the same 
aggregate abatement as actually occurred under the cap-and-trade program. On the aggregate 
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level, this translates into compliance costs of $150 to $270 million (1995$), or 16–25% per year 
higher than actually realized.  
Ellerman et al. (2000) provide another estimate of cost savings that is based on an 
extensive survey of the industry, with extrapolation to estimate long-run compliance costs.11 
They estimate the cost savings from emission trading, inclusive of savings attributable to 
banking, to be about 55% of total compliance costs under a command-and-control approach. 
Hence, the two major studies of cost savings (Carlson et al. 2000 and Ellerman et al. 2000) are in 
general agreement on this estimate.  
We mentioned previously that costs have declined over time with declining fuel prices 
(Ellerman and Montero 1998; Fieldston Company 1996; Burtraw 1996). Carlson et al. (2000) 
find that declining fuel prices lowered marginal control costs by about $200 per ton (1995$) over 
the decade preceding 1990. This trend continued into the 1990s. Hence, estimates of the cost of 
emission reductions and the cost savings from trading have both declined.  
Another reason that cost estimates have fallen over time is that the trading program 
ignited a search for ways to reduce emissions at lower cost. A third reason is the role of 
exogenous technical change that clearly would have occurred in the absence of the program. 
Carlson et al. (2000) show that technical improvements, including in overall generating 
efficiency, lowered the typical unit’s marginal abatement cost function by almost $50 per ton 
(1995$) of SO2 over the decade preceding 1995. 
The Carlson et al. model can help sort out the different factors’ influencing estimates of 
marginal abatement costs. The authors assert that the flexibility implicit in the policy that 
allowed the use of low-sulfur coal was responsible for about 80% of the decline in marginal 
abatement costs while technical change was responsible for about 20%. For a benchmark 
scenario in which relative fuel prices and technology (including the utilization rate of scrubbers) 
remain stable at 1995 levels, the model predicts long-run marginal abatement costs will be $436 
per ton (1995$). With prices held to their 1989 level (implying a higher price for low-sulfur coal 
relative to high-sulfur coal than obtained in 1995) and the time trend for technological change 
(factor productivity) also held at 1989 levels, marginal abatement costs rise to $560, a 28% 
                                                 
11 Ellerman (2003) provides another review of the SO2 program and an explicit comparison of Ellerman et al. (2000) 
and Carlson et al. (2000). 
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increase. It is noteworthy that this is not far from the estimate ($579–$760 in 1995$) offered by 
ICF (1990) that formed the primary cost information for the U.S. EPA.12  
5.4.2. Efficiency 
There is ample empirical evidence of cost savings in Phase I, but this does not mean the 
allowance market was perfectly efficient. A measure of efficiency is convergence of the marginal 
costs of abatement to the price of allowances traded on the market. Joskow et al. (1998) and 
Schmalensee et al. (1998) find that the market for allowances was relatively efficient in the early 
years of the SO2 emission trading program, noting that auction prices and private trading prices 
for SO2 allowances were virtually identical by the end of 1994 and they point to growth in the 
level of trading volume from 1995 to 1997. Ellerman (2003) concludes that the level of banking 
that occurred was consistent with rational, cost-minimizing behavior on the part of utilities. 
However, there is also evidence that the market did not lead firms to achieve their 
emissions reductions at minimum cost, i.e., to perform efficiently in the early years, and that 
some opportunities for cost savings were not realized. Carlson et al. find that, in the first two 
years of Phase I, marginal costs differed among facilities and actual compliance costs exceeded 
the least-cost solution by $280 million in 1995 and by $339 million in 1996 (1995$). Roughly 
speaking, this would erode about all of the potential gains from least-cost compliance. In 
contrast, Ellerman et al. (2000) provide an ex post cost estimate that is only about 3–15% above 
the modeled estimate of least-cost compliance in Phase I.  
Several studies point to state public utility regulations and other state laws as influences 
that have tended to undermine the efficiency of the SO2 market, leading many firms to pursue a 
policy of “autarchy” (no trade) and self-sufficiency in compliance in the first years of the 
program (Bohi 1994; Bohi and Burtraw 1997; Ellerman et al. 2000; Hart 2000; Swift 2001; 
Winebrake et al. 1995; Fullerton et al. 1997). Prior to implementation and during the early years 
of the program, many states felt a great deal of uncertainty about how regulators would treat 
allowance transactions in setting regulated rates, and this uncertainty damped utilities’ 
enthusiasm for using the allowance market (Burtraw 1996; Bohi 1994). Rose (1997) suggests 
that public utility commission (PUC) activities discouraged the use of the market in favor of 
strategies such as fuel switching. Rose et al. (1993) and Lile and Burtraw (1998) document a 
                                                 
12 The Carlson et al. (2000) preferred estimate of $291 assumes that utilization rates and performance of in-place 
scrubbers continue to improve and a slower retirement rate of coal-fired facilities.  
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number of PUC actions that promote use of locally mined high-sulfur coal coupled with 
scrubbing. 
Arimura (2002) uses econometric techniques to examine the extent to which PUC 
regulations have affected the performance of the SO2 market, focusing on compliance decisions 
at the generating-unit level. He specifically seeks to identify whether units with relatively low 
marginal abatement costs were reducing emissions while those with higher costs were buying 
allowances. Using data from Phase I and a probit model of the choice between fuel switching 
and allowance purchases, Arimura finds that, holding abatement costs and other characteristics 
fixed, generating units facing PUC regulations are more likely to rely on fuel switching for 
compliance rather than the allowance market.13 He also finds that in states with high-sulfur coal, 
where efforts were made to protect local coal producers, allowance purchases more used more 
than fuel switching for compliance. 
Sotkiewicz (2002) uses utility data for 1996 and exercised a simulation production cost 
model to evaluate facility performance. He also finds that PUC regulations governing cost 
recovery for investment in scrubbers led to cost increases ranging from 4.5% to 139% above 
least cost compliance. 
Testing the efficiency of the SO2 program has become a proving ground for the 
development of new techniques in production theory (Fare et al. 2004, 2003; Weber et al. 2002). 
This approach applies distance function methods to estimate how far the observed operation of 
(regulated) individual facilities is from efficient production. The indication from this literature is 
that significantly higher levels of efficiency were feasible early in the SO2 emissions trading 
program than were actually realized, although cost savings were still considerable.   Swinton 
(1998) finds that coal-burning electric plants with the highest emissions rates are also the plants 
with the lowest marginal abatement costs, a fact that may explain lower-than-expected prices in 
the new market for allowances. Coggins and Swinton (1996) study Wisconsin coal-burning 
utility plants to estimate the shadow price of SO2 abatement, which they find to be above the 
allowance prices observed from the few trades that had occurred by then. Swinton (2002) 
provides stronger conclusions, through analysis of shadow prices of emissions reductions from 
                                                 
13 This finding contrasts with Bailey (1996) who was not able to verify that PUC decisions impeded use of the 
allowance market.  
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power plants serving Florida, and finds compelling evidence that plant owners had not taken full 
advantage of the opportunities for cost savings that the allowance market provided.  
In an analysis of 40 plants from 1994-1998, Swinton (2004) finds no compelling 
evidence of the convergence of their marginal abatement costs among facilities, concluding that 
many power plants did not use the allowance market to its fullest potential. His results apparently 
contradict the expectation other authors voiced that the market is becoming more efficient over 
time. However, it is noteworthy that the years studied predate the implementation of competitive 
pricing of electricity in some parts of the country, which is thought to put increasing pressure on 
the entire industry to reduce costs. 
In sum, the question about performance in the early years of the SO2 trading program is 
one of perspective. Emission trading is a new institution that might be expected to pass through a 
period of transition before reaching a mature and efficient market. The issue is not only 
academic, because performance in the early years may be relevant to the design of trading 
programs in the future. Nonetheless, the literature appears to express almost uniformly the 
expectation of improved performance in the allowance market over time. 
5.5. General Equilibrium Effects and Allowance Allocation 
The discussion to this point has considered compliance costs only within the electricity 
sector. However, a full accounting of costs would take into account the interaction of the 
program with the full economy, including the preexisting tax system, such as the taxes on labor 
income. Recent theory asserts that any new regulation exacerbates the difference between the 
before-tax wage (or the value of the marginal product of labor to firms) and the after-tax wage 
(or the opportunity cost of labor from the worker’s perspective), thereby raising the cost of 
regulation.14  
Goulder et al. (1997) examine the SO2 program using both analytical and numerical 
general equilibrium models and find that the tax interaction effect adds 70% to the estimated 
program compliance costs. This estimate assumes the entire electricity sector sets prices in the 
                                                 
14 A complementary issue is the effect on the measure of benefits. Williams (2002) demonstrates that the 
improvement in labor productivity from reducing pollution can have sizable positive effects when measured in a 
general equilibrium framework. Carbone and Smith (2004) find that nonseparability between environmental quality 
and other goods in the utility function and substitution between leisure and environmental quality, as may result if 
lost work results from air pollution changes in health status, will reduce the general equilibrium cost of the program. 
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market. If prices were instead based on cost of service then the regulatory burden would be much 
lower because allowances under Title IV were distributed at zero original cost. In fact only about 
half of the nation uses competitive pricing of electricity today. The authors find the tax 
interaction effect would be reduced substantially if the government auctioned the allowances and 
used the revenues from the auction to reduce preexisting distortionary taxes instead of giving 
allowances away for free.  
Burtraw and Palmer (2004) draw on Goulder et al. (1997) and Carlson et al. (2000) to 
characterize the relative potential cost savings from allowance trading and the hidden costs of 
grandfathered emissions allowances compared with a command-and-control approach. Carlson et 
al. find that compliance (partial equilibrium) costs under the command-and-control scenario are 
35% higher than the costs under a least-cost approach. Goulder et al. (1997) find that the general 
equilibrium costs of a policy in which emission allowances were auctioned are about 129% of 
the partial equilibrium measure of costs in the least-cost solution, and the costs of a policy that 
fails to raise revenues such as the SO2 program represents about 171% of the least-cost partial 
equilibrium estimate. On net the general equilibrium measure of the cost of a command-and-
control policy—a uniform emissions standard applied to all sources—is 178% of the cost of  
the least-cost solution in a partial equilibrium framework. In other words, the failure to raise 
revenue through the use of an auction with the use of that revenue to offset distorting taxes 
squanders much of the savings in compliance costs that could be achieved by a flexible tradable 
allowance system. 
5.6. Compliance Choice and Technological Change 
A large theoretical literature on the relationship between environmental regulation and 
innovation generally finds that the incentive for cost-reducing innovation is much larger with 
incentive-based regulation than with less flexible approaches such as facility-specific emission 
standards (Fischer, Parry, and Pizer 2003; Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince 1992, 
1989; Zerbe 1970). The implementation of market-based policies for SO2 emissions under Title 
IV has provided a somewhat unique opportunity to study the effects of emission allowance 
trading on technological change and innovation. This includes both effects on technology 
adoption and process changes at regulated firms and innovations in upstream input markets.  
Several papers have been written that explore these issues, with approaches that include 
the simulation of compliance choices under different regulatory regimes and the econometric 
estimation of the implications of technological change and innovation on scrubber technology, 
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fuel extraction and distribution, and on cost savings and efficiency. Researchers have also  
used patent data to conduct empirical studies of the relationship between regulation and 
technological change. 
5.6.1. Compliance Choice 
One of the key questions involved in technological change and Title IV regards the 
effects of the regulatory policy on the choice of abatement technique, with the use of scrubbers 
and switching among the types of coal used for electricity generation being the primary options. 
Some argue that Title IV’s most significant impact was actually in the regulatory innovation of 
allowing abatement options other than scrubbing. Ellerman et al. (1997) estimate that 45.1% of 
emissions reductions in 1995 came from SO2 scrubbing, with the remaining 54.9% coming from 
switching to other fuels, such as low-sulfur coal, and about half as many scrubbers as were 
originally anticipated were installed during Phase I. By 2001, during Phase II, Ellerman (2003) 
estimates that 37% of emission reductions were due to SO2 scrubbers. All told thirty new 
scrubbers were installed on generating units. All of these were affected by Phase I, but three of 
the scrubbers were not brought on line until Phase II.  
Other evidence bolsters the case that the flexibility associated with allowance trading has 
led to efficiency improvements that have reduced the cost of controlling SO2 emissions. For 
instance Burtraw (2000) finds that blending of coals with different sulfur contents has enabled 
much greater reduction than had been anticipated before Title IV. Furthermore, the flexible 
nature of the SO2 program enabled facilities to reduce the scrubber capacity needed to achieve 
roughly equivalent reductions in emissions. Prior to Title IV, scrubber systems usually included 
a spare module to maintain low emissions rates in the event that any other module became 
inoperative. One estimate indicates that a spare module would increase capital costs by one-third 
(U.S. EIA 1994). Allowances reduced the need for spare modules because allowances could be 
used for compliance during maintenance periods or unplanned outages. 
Decisions about compliance depend importantly on the relative costs of fuel switching 
versus installing scrubbers. Technological change in these upstream markets plays an important 
role here, as addressed in the next two subsections.  
5.6.2. Scrubber Costs and Performance 
Another form of innovation the SO2 allowance-trading program induced is improvement 
in scrubber performance. Burtraw (2000, 1996) argues that the flexibility associated with 
allowance trading created a form of competition with scrubbing, which provided incentives to 
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reducing scrubbing costs. Keohane (2003) and Taylor (2001) both find that abatement costs per 
ton of removal have fallen substantially, especially in retrofitted scrubbers installed for 
compliance in the SO2 program.  
Part of the decline in scrubber costs was due to improved performance, which enabled an 
increase in the utilization of scrubbed units in Phase I (Ellerman et al. 2000; Carlson et al. 2000). 
Increased utilization is important to reducing the average cost of scrubbing because it spreads 
capital costs over a greater number of tons reduced. Before the SO2 program, scrubbers did not 
exhibit reliability rates sufficient to achieve the current level of utilization. Popp (2003) finds 
that the move to cap-and-trade regulation for SO2 in the late 1990s was accompanied by an 
improvement in the SO2 removal efficiency of scrubbers. Keohane (2002) also finds that 
operating efficiency of scrubbers increased and brought about large declines in costs per ton  
of SO2 removed. In contrast to other studies, Bellas (1998) produces less supportive empirical 
results, although without the benefit of a more recent dataset, finding that while operating  
costs seem to decline over the lifetime of a scrubber unit, no significant progress has occurred  
in abatement technology. Nonetheless, under Title IV recent vintages of scrubbers reduce 
potential stack emissions of SO2 by 95 percent or more while the median emission reduction 
prior to the revised NSPS for SO2 in the late 1970s was closer to 80% (Popp 2003, Taylor et al. 
2003). The greater reliability of today’s systems also contributes to higher total SO2 removal 
(Taylor et al. 2003). 
5.6.3. Fuel Costs 
The higher than anticipated reliance on low-sulfur coal was spurred in part by its low 
costs. Sales of low-sulfur coal (defined as less than 0.6 pounds of sulfur per million Btus) 
increased by 28% between 1990 and 1994 while prices fell by 9%. Meanwhile, sales of high-
sulfur coal (defined as greater than 1.67 pounds of sulfur per million Btus) fell by 18%, although 
prices fell by only 6% (U.S. EIA 1995a, 1995b; Resource Data International 1995). 
Two trends explain the accelerated decline in the price of low-sulfur coal. The most 
important has been the roughly 50% reduction in cost of rail transportation of low-sulfur western 
coal, driven by investment and innovation in the rail industry. To a great extent, this decline in 
costs would have occurred even in the absence of the SO2 program due to the deregulation of the 
railroads under the Staggers Act (Ellerman and Montero 1998; Ellerman et al. 2000). A second 
explanation is that the higher capital and other costs expected for using low-sulfur coal failed to 
materialize because of the flexibility offered by Title IV and greater reliance on fuel blending 
(Burtraw 2000). Prior to Title IV, blending of different fuels was not thought to be feasible 
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(Torrens et al. 1992), but experimentation in response to the allowance market demonstrated  
that the detrimental effects of blending low-sulfur coal with other coals were smaller than 
originally thought. 
The extent to which any portion of the decline in low-sulfur fuel costs is attributable to 
Title IV is subject to question. Studies by Kunce et al. (2004), and Keohane and Busse (2004) 
both find that the railroads, not the mines, captured rents from the large increase in post-1990 
CAAA-driven demand for low-sulfur Powder River Basin coal, although Keohane and Busse 
(2004) propose a unique two-part tariff pricing scheme to explain these results. Kunce et al. 
(2004) conclude that the introduction of marketable emission allowances under the SO2 program 
in 1990 had no effect on using low-sulfur coal to generate electrical power. Instead, declining 
costs both in mining and in rail transportation of coal appear to be responsible for this outcome. 
However, Burtraw (2000) provides anecdotes suggesting that the cost of low-sulfur coal 
delivered to eastern power plants fell because of dramatic investment and aggressive pricing 
aimed at capturing new markets that were available in part because of Title IV. 
5.6.4. Patenting 
Another line of research has taken advantage of more accessible U.S. patent databases to 
study the effects of regulation on patentable innovations in pollution abatement. Popp (2003), 
concludes that SO2 regulation prior to 1990 created incentives for innovation directed primarily 
toward lowering the cost of operating scrubbers, while since the implementation of Title IV 
firms have had an incentive both to lower the cost of scrubbers and to improve their removal 
efficiency (and thus environmental effectiveness). While relevant yearly patent counts actually 
declined after 1990, the quality of innovations appears to have improved. This allows flexibility 
in emissions abatement choice, reducing the need for government to successfully “pick winners,” 
and research resources to be spread more efficiently. A subsequent international study of 
pollution control patenting by Popp (2004) finds that environmental regulation is associated with 
increased patenting in the United States, but not in other countries. 
6. Regulatory History of NOx 
Emissions of NOx contribute to fine particulates, acidification, and ozone. Although its 
contribution to particulate concentrations is usually identified as the more important impact of 
NOx (U.S. EPA 1998b), the regulatory handles for reductions have stemmed from concerns 
about acid rain and attainment of air quality standards for ozone. Ozone is formed by the 
  24Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Evans, Krupnick, Palmer, Toth 
atmospheric mixing of NOx and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and facilitated by warm 
temperatures and sunlight. The electricity sector only contributes 22% of NOx emissions in the 
United States, but it is the primary stationary source.15 The vast majority of NOx emissions 
comes from off- and on-road vehicles. 
Stationary sources of NOx emissions, particularly existing ones, faced little binding 
regulation until the 1990s. Like SO2, since the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act new 
sources as well as those undertaking major modification have been subject to performance 
standards based on emissions per unit of heat input. Given the slow turnover of generation 
capital and, some might say, lax enforcement of these standards for modified sources, the new 
source provisions led to relatively minor reductions in NOx emissions.  
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments brought regulatory attention to existing NOx 
sources in two ways. The first was through the acid rain provisions outlined in Title IV where a 
key component was the two million ton per year reduction of NOx emissions from coal-fired 
boilers. Sources of NOx faced additional attention in Title I of the amendments. Title I provided 
timetables and methodologies for the states to bring regions into compliance with national 
ambient air quality standards. The ozone standard was, and continues to be, a requirement that 
localities find particularly difficult to comply with, and their compliance efforts, sometimes 
aided by Congress, have involved various trading programs to bring NOx emissions down (as 
well as many other types of programs).  
Although the most widely recognized focus of Title IV are its SO2 provisions, the 
contribution of NOx emissions to acid rain was also addressed for the first time in Title IV. Title 
IV applied to existing coal-fired boilers emitting NOx a traditional prescriptive approach similar 
to the type used for new sources. The requirements specify emission rate limitations, based on 
emissions per unit of heat content of the coal, expected to be achievable using particular 
abatement technologies. While these standards vary by the type of boiler, the presumed controls 
typically are combustion modifications such as low-NOx burners. Because these are emission 
rate standards, it is possible for overall emissions to increase if fuel use rises. So, unlike a cap-
and-trade program, if NOx emissions from a source rise commensurate reductions are not 
required from other sources. Another interesting component of the Title IV NOx provisions is 
that a company may average the NOx emissions from its boilers as part of its compliance 
                                                 
15 EPA Current Emissions Trend Database at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends. 
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strategy. That is, a boiler may emit above its assigned rate provided other boilers owned by the 
same firm are on net emitting below their allowable rates. The averaging provisions were often 
adopted.16
In regions in non-attainment with ozone standards, Title I required states to promulgate 
emissions rate limits for large point sources of both NOx and VOCs. EPA suggested that the 
states adopt emission rates for affected coal-fired boilers that were essentially the same as those 
under Title IV. States generally followed this guidance and so boilers typically complied with the 
requirements of Titles I and IV simultaneously, with the important caveats that the Title I 
requirements came into effect sooner and allowed firms less flexibility.17  
Most fossil-fuel burning facilities are not affected by the Title I emissions standard 
provisions, however, as they are not located in regions designated in nonattainment (typically 
urbanized areas). However, atmospheric modeling demonstrates that precursor emissions from 
sources outside the boundaries of nonattainment areas have an important influence on ozone 
formation in them. Indeed, many jurisdictions argue that pollution coming from sources outside 
their jurisdiction is sufficient for them to violate, or nearly violate the ozone standard, even if 
their own emissions were reduced to zero. While these external sources have an important 
influence on ozone concentrations in nonattainment regions, most states found it difficult to 
credit NOx reductions from them towards their required Title I compliance activities. In part this 
is because they are actually outside the state and thus beyond the regulator’s direct control, but it 
also was due to regulatory restrictions on what states could count towards compliance plan 
obligations in nonattainment regions.  
An important exception to the limitations most states face in controlling NOx emissions 
from upwind sources is found in the northeastern states. Congress recognized the need for a 
regional strategy for the Northeast corridor to achieve compliance with the ozone standard and 
created the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) under Title I. The states that belong to the 
commission cooperated in the development of emission rate NOx and VOC standards for point 
sources (as well as harmonizing compliance strategies for mobile sources). Recognizing that the 
emission rate standards would not be sufficient for ozone compliance, in 1994 the states agreed 
                                                 
16 Burtraw and Evans (2004) provide further discussion of the Title IV NOX and inter-state NOX policies. 
17 Some state regulations, like Pennsylvania’s, also had averaging provisions similar to those provided under Title 
IV. 
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to implement a trading program for large sources of NOx emissions. The OTC NOx Budget 
Program began in 1999 and, focusing on the time when conditions for ozone formation are most 
favorable, regulates emissions from May 1 to September 30. 
Meanwhile, other regions of the country faced continuing difficulty attaining the ozone 
standard in part because of their inability to control upwind NOx emissions. Although most 
regions generally saw reductions in ozone concentrations since the 1990 amendments, from 1998 
to 2000, 30 of the 98 regions that violated the ozone standard in 1991 continued to do so, while 
six additional areas had fallen into nonattainment. In response to concerns that they would not 
achieve the ozone standard, a collection of states including those in the Northeast and those 
stretching from the upper Midwest to the southeast, participated in a process known as the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group. This, ultimately unsuccessful, process was an effort to develop 
consensus among the states for a coordinated effort to reduce ground-level ozone in the eastern 
United States. Many of the northeastern states also pursued reductions in NOx emissions from 
upwind states employing Section 126 of Title I of the 1990 CAAA that allows states to petition 
the administrator of the EPA to require such reductions. In response to these concerns, the EPA 
proposed and subsequently promulgated a seasonal emissions trading plan for NOx, known as the 
NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call Program, that began in 2003 and affects point sources 
in 19 eastern states. This program is modeled on the approach the northeastern states took but 
requires greater NOx reductions and essentially superseded it. 
One region that does not have problems with upwind pollution, but finds considerable 
difficulty in attaining the ozone standard nonetheless, is the Los Angeles basin. The basin is 
particularly susceptible to ozone formation due to surrounding mountains and warm 
temperatures that create an inversion layer in the air basin.18 Fears about the inability to achieve 
the ambient ozone standard solely with prescriptive measures motivated the South Coast Air 
Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to start the first large urban cap and trade programs 
for NOx in 1994.19 This program is known as the REgional Clean Air Incentives Market 
(RECLAIM).  
                                                 
18 Of course, its large population and the heavy reliance on vehicle travel of its residents also contribute to the 
problem. 
19 The program also initially was intended to institute a cap with trading for VOCs and SO2. The VOC program was 
not adopted due to concerns about measuring these emissions. The SO2 program is smaller and less active than the 
NOX program. Since this time additional urban NOx trading programs have been adopted in Texas.  
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The regional NOx cap-and-trade programs have contributed to substantial reductions in 
NOx emissions from point sources, but compliance with the ozone standard will continue to be a 
challenge. In part this is due to the difficulty in controlling mobile sources and in part to a 1997 
tightening of the ozone standard. Expected to take effect sometime between 2009 and 2014, the 
new ozone standard averages air quality measurements over eight-hour time blocks rather than 
one-hour time blocks, increasing the difficulty of compliance. Had the new ozone standard been 
in effect from 1998 to 2000, 329 counties would have been in nonattainment.  
7. NOx Trading Programs  
7.1 RECLAIM 
The goal of RECLAIM was to reduce emissions from about 390 facilities by 8% per year 
from 1994 through 2003. A special feature of the trading market is that it has involved two 
zones, and trading between zones can only occur in one direction so that the implicit shift in 
emissions did not contribute to downwind pollution. One proposal would have involved 38 zones 
with a complex set of trading restrictions; however modeling indicated that environmental 
concerns could be satisfied with a two-zone approach that also was administratively simple 
enough to enable cost savings from trading (Johnson and Pekelney 1996). 
A RECLAIM trading credit allows the holder to emit one pound of NOx. The compliance 
period is annual with some sources reporting emissions from January to December and others 
from July to June. Sources in these two groups, or cycles, are provided allowances that may only 
be used in the compliance year they are allocated. So, allowances may not be banked, at least not 
in a straightforward manner. Because sources in the different cycles may trade with one another, 
the staggered allowance allocation provides some opportunity for intertemporal shifting of 
allowance use (emissions) if sources in separate cycles continuously swapped their allowances. 
There is some evidence for this behavior, but the extent is unclear.  
A contentious issue in RECLAIM was the allocation of allowances. The program gave 
firms the flexibility to choose a baseline level between 1989 and 1992. This was a period of high 
economic activity, while in the first years of the program the economy was not thriving.20 
                                                 
20 U.S. EPA (2002) claims that the recession cannot fully explain why emissions were so far below total allocations 
in the early periods of the program. However, it does not identify a complementary explanation. 
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Coupled with the inability to bank allowances, there consequently was an ample surplus of 
emission allowances that expired unused, few real emission reductions, low allowance prices, 
and little trading of the early year vintages (Klier et al. 1997). Indeed, SCAQMD correctly 
anticipated that emissions would be far below allocations in early periods and this expectation 
contributed to the decision to prohibit banking (Coy et al. 2001).  
In the first half of 2000 the performance of the market began to change as the price of a 
NOx credit rose from $1 to $30 and meaningful trades began to take place. This tightening of the 
NOx market was expected because the allocation in 2000 was close to the level of emissions in 
the immediately proceeding years (Coy et al. 2001). However, the cause of this run-up wasn’t 
really the anticipated supply side phenomenon, but rather the abrupt increase in allowance 
demand from electricity producers due to the flawed deregulation plan in California.21 By the 
spring of 2001 NOx credits were trading at over $60 as demand for allowances substantially 
outpaced supply and sources began to fall into noncompliance, precipitating significant changes 
to RECLAIM that are described below.  
7.2. OTC NOX Budget Program  
Created by the 1990 CAAA, the Ozone Transport Commission consists of 11 member 
states that include the northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States stretching from Maryland to Maine 
as well as the District of Columbia and northern counties of Virginia. The OTC NOx Budget 
Program began with the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1994 by all of the states 
in the region except Virginia.  
The OTC NOx Budget Program envisioned a three-phase effort to reduce emissions from 
large stationary sources, primarily electric utilities and large industrial boilers. The first phase of 
the program was simply the preexisting emissions rate standards required by Title I of the 1990 
CAAA. The second phase of the plan marked the beginning of the cap-and-trade policy and was 
to run from 1999 to 2002. The third phase was to begin in 2003 and required a tightening of the 
emissions cap. By 2003, the emission cap would represent an approximate 70% reduction from 
the five-month summer emissions of 490,000 tons in 1990 from the affected sources. As 
                                                 
21 Additional evidence that this is the case comes from the RECLAIM SO2 market. In 2000 the allocation of SO2 
allowances fell below historic annual emissions, but there was no dramatic price spike in this market. This is 
attributable to the absence of the electricity generators in the region, which fire natural gas and light oil, from the 
SO2 market.  
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described above, the third phase of this program was scrapped once the federally managed NOx 
SIP Call program was in place. An original proposal for the OTC NOx Budget program 
envisioned three regions with constraints on trading among regions. In light of results of a 
market simulation model suggesting that such constraints were unnecessary, this approach was 
abandoned in favor of a unified market. 
Unlike the RECLAIM program and the SO2 trading program, the OTC NOx Budget 
program requires a high level of coordination among states. The memorandum of understanding 
implementing the program laid out a procedure for calculating each state’s emissions reduction 
responsibility from the affected sources and hence its share of the emissions cap. The NOx cap 
was calculated by typically assuming a particular percentage reduction in emissions from each 
source where the assumed emission reduction depended primarily on the location of the source. 
Each state then had discretion as to how it allocated its share of the total cap, its “budget,” to its 
affected sources. Each allowances allowed the holder to emit one ton of NOx.  
While the engagement of the states was clearly important to the development of the NOx 
Budget program22, the facilitating role of the EPA should not be underestimated. Drawing on its 
knowledge developing the SO2 trading program, the EPA performed atmospheric modeling for 
the states and took the lead in developing, managing, and funding the program’s emissions 
monitoring and allowance tracking systems (Donovan et al. 1997; Schary and Culligan 1997). 
The monitoring procedures generally relied on the pre-existing systems that affected sources had 
to adopt for compliance with the Title IV NOx provisions. The EPA also participated in the 
development of a model rule that identified and suggested elements that should be consistent 
among the participating states’ regulations. 
A major conflict that regulators faced in the design of the OTC NOx Budget Program was 
how to provide affected sources flexibility through banking while preventing a rapid depletion in 
banked allowances.23 As a compromise, the trading program has a unique constraint on banking, 
called progressive flow control, which limits the number of allowances that can be withdrawn 
from a source’s allowance bank rather than the number of allowances that can go into the bank. 
Once flow control is triggered, only a share of the allowances in every source’s bank can be 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Farrell (2001). 
23 This concern ignores the incongruity between the annual time scale of the program and the daily scale of ozone 
formation.  
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withdrawn on a one-to-one basis. Once a withdrawal exceeds this share additional reductions are 
subject to a discount of two allowances per ton of emissions. The share that can be withdrawn on 
par with emissions is equal to the ratio of 10% of the total allocation to the total number of 
allowances banked in the region. The 10% value was chosen because it reflected the historical 
change in emissions that resulted in years when there was low nuclear availability in the region 
(Schary and Culligan 1997).24  
Despite the generally agreed upon model rule, there were considerable differences in the 
state laws and regulations implementing the trading program, specifically in allowance allocation 
mechanisms and special programs that provided additional allowance allocations for the 
adoption of specific technologies. States typically did not attempt to affect the allowance market 
by restricting trades. Table 1, which follows, illustrates the variety of policies among the states.25
                                                 
24 Unexpectedly, since the adoption of the program the performance of nuclear generators has increased 
dramatically (EPA 2003). The rise in nuclear availability is due to deregulation in the electricity market (Zhang, 
2005). 
25 This table, while comprehensive, does not include all the information the authors have gathered on state 
programs. For more information contact David Evans at evans@rff.org.  
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Table 1 OTC NOX Budget 1999-2002 Participation and Allocation Rules 
 
 
State  Allocation 
Method















Industrial and Cogeneration Units, 
New Units and New Utility Units 
receive enough allowances to satisfy 
their emissions subject to, at most, 
95% of their allowable maximum 
emission rate. Utility Units receive at 
minimum a percentage of the 
difference between the reserves for 
the other unit categories and the 
state’s NOX Budget. 
Yes, based 
on ’97 and 
’98 over-
compliance 







1990 Emissions, OTC NOX Budget 
(USEPA 1995b) 
Yes, based 
on ’97 and 
’98 over-
compliance 






Allocations are listed for existing 
sources. Recent sources (’90–’98) 
have a maximum use-or-lose 
allocation. Half the forfeited 
allowances are distributed to existing 
sources and half are retained by the 















Full Allocation Units receive enough 
allowances to satisfy their emissions 
subject to a predetermined maximum 
allocation (use-or-lose units with a 
’99 caveat). New Units provided 
allowances subject to availability in 
first operating season, and then 
become Full Allocation Units. 
Special Units receive a fixed 
Yes, based 
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State  Allocation 
Method











allocation of allowances each season. 
Utility Units receive at minimum a 
percentage of the allowances 
remaining after the new source set 
aside, the full allocation set aside, and 






Allocations for existing sources are 
listed in regulation without any 
indication as to how they were 
determined. New sources are 
allocated allowances equal to 


















Allocations are based on historic heat 
inputs (the highest two of previous 
three seasons) and historic emissions 
rates (the corresponding emission 
rates of the previous three seasons 
with the two highest heat rates) in 
combination with actual emissions. 
Yes, based 















Allocations are listed in regulation 
without any indication as to how they 
were determined. New sources are 
allocated allowances equal to 
emissions, subject to availability. 
Yes, based 
















Allocations are listed in regulation 
without any indication as to how they 
were determined. 
Yes, based 
on ’97 and 
’98 over-
compliance 




Allocations are listed in regulation 
without any indication as to how they 
were determined. 
No No      Yes
11 Yes Yes
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Notes for Table 1:  
                                                 
1 Fixed allocation: Allocation where sources know for four years of phase 2 a minimum allocation they will receive. Generally this what is referred 
to as grandfathering. 
Use or lose: Sources allocated allowances based on their actual emissions in that year and no more (but perhaps less). Provides no incentive to 
reduce emissions in order to sell allowances. 
Annual Update: Total allocation is updated annually. Formula for allocation in each year is based on behavior in immediately proceeding years 
(usually 1 to 3 years back). Works as a subsidy to whatever increases (production, input use, emissions) a source’s allocation. For more, see Burtraw et al. 
2002. 
2 Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, Title 22a. Environmental Protection, Department of Environmental Protection, Abatement of Air 
Pollution, Sec. 22a-174-22a The Nitrogen Oxides NOx Budget Program. 
3 Regulation No. 37 : NOx Budget Program 
4 Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR), Title 26 Department of the Environment, subtitle 11 Air Quality, Chapter 27 Post RACT Requirements 
for NOx Sources (NOx Budget Program) and Chapter 28 Policies and Procedures Relating to Maryland’s NOx Budget Program. 
5 Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR), 310 Department of Environmental Protection, 7.00 Air Pollution Control, Section 7.27 NOx 
Allowance Program 
6 New Hampshire Code of Administrative Rules. Chapter Env-A 3200. NOx Budget Trading Program 
7 New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC), Title 7, Chapter 27, Subchapter 31. NOx Budget Program. 
8 Title 6 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York (NYCRR). Chapter III. Subchapter A, Part 227, 
Subpart 227-3. Pre-2003 Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Budget And Allowance Program. Pre-2003 Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Budget and Allowance 
Program. 
9 Title 25. Environmental Protection, Part I. Department of Environmental Protection, Subpart C. Protection of Natural Resources, Article III. Air 
Resources, Chapter 123. Standards for Contaminants, NOx Allowance Requirements. 
10 Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, Office of Air Resources, Air Pollution Control Regulation 38. Nitrogen Oxides 
Allowance Program. 
11 The Rhode Island regulations state; “No budget source may transfer allowances from its compliance account for 1999 and each year thereafter, 
through and including 2002.” The remainder of 38.7 describes conditions and procedures for transfers. It appears that Rhode Island sources can only buy 
emissions and only from outside the state. In 1999 all Rhode Island sources over controlled and none engaged in a transaction (1999 NATS). 
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     The final allocation for 1999 for the states that participated in the OTC NOx Budget program 
reflects a 54% reduction from these states’ five-month summer 1990 baseline of 417,444 tons. 
Total emissions amounted to 174,843 tons, and the remaining allowances were banked. The 
program became a model for the decentralized multijurisdictional emissions trading program that 
took shape in the subsequent NOx SIP Call Program (Schary and Culligan 1997). 
7.3. The NOX SIP Call 
The OTC region is only a portion of the eastern United States that is significantly 
affected by transboundary movements of NOx. As described above, the Ozone Transport 
Assessment Group was established to provide recommendations regarding ways to address this 
problem over a larger region. However, the group’s final report, released in June 1997, provided 
few actionable recommendations.  
In late 1997, under Section 110 of the 1990 CAAA, EPA exercised its authority to 
require states to impose restrictions on electricity generators and industrial sources of NOx 
emissions to help downwind states comply with the ozone standard. The rule is known as the 
NOx SIP Call, because it called on states to revise their state implementation plans that outline 
their strategies for complying with federal ambient standards. The NOx SIP Call assigns each 
state a summertime NOx emission budget for large point sources. Although this covers a broad 
area and the effects of emissions depend on their location, Krupnick and McConnell (2000) 
found that uniform one-for-one allowance trading within the region approximated a cost-
effective outcome. A state has the flexibility to either require its sources to directly comply with 
the state budget or, as the EPA preferred, to participate in a regional cap-and-trade program. 
Other similarities of NOx SIP Call to the OTC NOx Budget Program include the flexibility of the 
states to determine how their budgets should be allocated, the flow-control restrictions on 
banking, and the allowance providing the right to emit one ton of NOx.  
The NOx SIP Call initially targeted 22 states and the District of Columbia. Nearly 90% of 
the boilers covered in the Title IV program are located in these states. After legal proceedings the 
start date for the program was postponed until May 31, 2004.26 The region was also reduced to 
19 states and the District of Columbia. After 2004, the compliance season will begin May 1 and 
                                                 
26 Although the first year will have a shortened trading season, seasonal budgets (and thus NOx allowances) are 
unaffected, allowing an average emissions rate that is higher than in subsequent years. 
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all affected states in the region except North Carolina will fully participate in the trading 
program. Rather than initiate the third phase of the NOx Budget Program, states in the OTC 
region choose to comply with the SIP Call restrictions starting May 1, 2003.  
At the national level, the NOx SIP Call is expected to lead to reductions of 22% from  
an annual baseline level of 5.4 million tons in 2007. National summer-season emissions are 
expected to fall by 40% from 2.4 million tons in 2007. In the SIP Call region, the program is 
expected to lead to annual reductions of 34% from projected baseline levels of 3.51 million  
tons in 2007 and summertime emission reductions of 62%, from 1.5 million tons to 0.56  
million tons27 
8. Measures of Effectiveness for NOx Trading 
As for SO2, we consider whether the environment is affected by the spatial or temporal 
pattern of emission trading, the operational success of NOx markets, and the ability of the 
programs to achieve cost savings.  
8.1. The Environment  
Until trading in the RECLAIM program was suspended in 2001, emission reduction 
targets were achieved and evidence suggests that there was no distinct shift in the geographic 
distribution of emissions (Luong et al. 2000). Similarly, for the OTC NOx Budget Program, Swift 
(2004) finds very little emission shifting, as emission reductions in most states (especially large 
ones) were close to the average of 11%. Slightly greater emission reductions occurred in New 
England, while emissions were slightly higher in Maryland; fortunately the shift was north-south 
in nature and thus did not contribute to hotspots. Emission reductions in the western part of the 
region were equivalent to the reductions in the east. Moreover, Swift (2004) finds that the largest 
emitters prior to implementation of the program had disproportionately large reductions in 
emissions, suggesting that areas most greatly affected by NOx emissions have realized the 
greatest benefits.  
Moving from spatial to temporal shifting of emissions, Swift shows the program resulted 
in lowering NOx emissions both in total and on high emissions days. Farrell (2003) uses more 
                                                 
27 U.S. EPA 1998b, Figure 2-4 and Table 2-4. One reason these numbers are approximate is that the reductions 
pertain to EPA’s original program that targeted 22 states and the District of Columbia.  
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sophisticated techniques to show specifically that average and peak emissions have been lowered 
in equal proportion, alleviating concerns about temporal hotspots. Given that reductions occurred 
both in total and on high emissions days one may begin to draw the conclusion that cap-and-
trade programs are perhaps more effective than rate-based standards in consistently reducing 
emissions regardless of short-term changes. However, it cannot be ignored that the rate-based 
standards are still effective during the ozone season and perhaps prevent particularly excessive 
emissions in a short-term period. Farrell (2003) suggests that this combination of regulations 
may be preferred to unrestricted allowance trading. 
8.2. The Allowance Market 
8.2.1 RECLAIM 
The RECLAIM market has been marked by regulatory uncertainty since its inception 
(Klier et al. 1997). As mentioned above, the crisis of the California electricity market led to 
dramatic changes in the design of RECLAIM. The electricity market in California was 
deregulated in 1998 and, mostly due to the poor design of the deregulation program, sufficient 
generation capacity was not available.28 As a consequence, in 2000 less frequently used 
generators in the Los Angeles area were pressed into extensive service. In 2000, electricity 
generators were allocated 2,350 tons of credits (14% of the total allocation), purchased about 
2,250 tons of credits, but emitted 1,100 tons over their total holdings (Coy et al. 2001; Ellerman 
et al. 2003).29
In May 2001, the SCAQMD removed the electricity generators from the RECLAIM 
market. They were also required to install pollution control technologies. In addition, all sources 
emitting over 50 tons were required to submit binding compliance plans in 2002. These plans 
describe how the sources will comply with RECLAIM until 2006 and are binding.  
Could the contagion of the electricity market to the RECLAIM market have been 
avoided? RECLAIM is the exception that proves the rule with respect to allowance banking. One 
way to help avoid the spike in prices would have been to allow allowance banking (in a simple 
form) all along. Had banking been allowed, sources with low-cost abatement options would have 
                                                 
28 For details on the crises of the electricity market in California, see Joskow and Kahn 2002 and Brennan 2001.  
29 It is difficult to attribute exactly the share of emissions and allowances held in a particular year to sources given 
the overlapping allocation cycles. 
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had an incentive to adopt them early and retain the allowances for future periods, even in the 
case where allocations were higher than the current demand for emissions, as occurred in the SO2 
program.30 By allowing banking, sources have a greater incentive to think about their long-term 
position in the market. Unconstrained banking also equilibrates prices across vintages of credits. 
In this case, rather than seeing abrupt price changes from year to year, the price signal, the sign 
of the scarcity of the credits, is clearer to all participants.  
What of the unused credits from the early years of the program? The appropriate solution 
to the concern that some of the allowances banked in early years would not represent real 
emissions reductions would have been to reduce the cap, not eliminate banking. That emissions 
were below allocations in the early periods, and the price of allowances from those years was 
essentially zero, implies that additional reductions were costless. At the same time clearly there 
were health costs of those additional emissions. An opposing argument to banking is that a 
substantial increase in emissions in the region as a result of drawing down the bank would go 
against the goals of the program. However, because the caps are annual and ozone formation is 
an episodic problem,31 the cap-and-trade program, rather than banking itself, is inadequate to 
prevent an increase in emissions on a day with particularly stagnant, warm air.  
Some might claim that had a command-and-control program been in place in the Los 
Angeles area the compliance difficulties of 2000 wouldn’t have occurred. But there were 
command-and-control policies affecting the electricity generators in urban areas elsewhere in 
California that provide a telling story (Lloyd 2001). During the crisis, generators in other 
California cities violated annual restrictions on NOx emissions, operating hours, and fuel use. 
Where allowed emissions are a function of the amount of electricity generated or fuel used, these 
emission increases did not attract attention because with greater utilization these sources could 
legally emit more (and without commensurate reductions elsewhere or at another time, as would 
                                                 
30 Such behavior would also resolve uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the abatement technologies at a more 
favorable time. Resolving these uncertainties before reductions are needed, rather than relying on just-in-time 
reductions, provides greater planning flexibility and price certainty.  
31 Few regulations of any nature address the short time horizons presented by ozone. Most approaches address 
operations over a longer time scale and thus don’t assure reductions in those weather events when control is most 
needed. A market-based, but difficult to implement, solution to the situation where it is recognized that emissions 
need to be controlled in the near future and for a brief period of time is called episodic emissions trading (Bharvirkar 
et al. 2003). 
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be true under emission trading). So it seems unlikely that a command-and-control policy would 
have responded any better to the challenges faced in Los Angeles in 2000. 
Were the changes made to RECLAIM in 2001 wise? The changes were to pull the 
electricity generators out of the market and require future compliance plans. These changes run 
counter to EPA’s recommendation in its 2002 review of RECLAIM: “Once programs are up and 
running, major regulatory changes may be disruptive. Therefore, any actions taken to change or 
stabilize the market should be incremental and market based, rather than programmatic.” 
The requirement for future compliance plans commits the affected sources to control 
techniques that later on may not be advantageous. The effect on the market of the compliance 
plans is telling. Prior to the submittal date for the compliance plans, trading was very active as 
sources procured allowances. Since that time the market has been thin with few sources making 
trades on future year vintages. Thin markets can contribute to inefficiency (as the competitive 
pressure on the allowance price is relaxed). Thin markets also are an indication that firms are 
relying on go-it-alone strategies rather than relying on the market, implying a greater overall 
compliance cost for the abatement achieved. 
A different way to address the problem of emissions increases beyond allowance 
holdings is to charge a preannounced fee on these excess emissions. This cap on allowance 
prices is called a safety valve, which provides insurance against the possibility of unexpectedly 
high allowance prices (Pizer 2002). Quite recently, the SCAQMD adopted provisions that bring 
the electricity generators back into the RECLAIM market. In addition, the total annual allocation 
is expected to fall about 11.7% from 2004 levels in 2007 and an additional 10.8% in 2008 
(Unger 2005). To address spikes in allowance prices the new changes include a provision similar 
to a safety valve. If allowances go above $7.50 per pound, the SCAQMD could decide to 
increase annual allocations (up to 2004 levels) in the following year. But, unlike the safety valve, 
the decision to do so is at the discretion of the SCAQMD adding uncertainty to the market. In 
addition, sources may petition the SCAQMD for an exemption from the additional allowance 
reductions based on their adoption of stringent abatement controls. However, any reductions not 
taken from the allocations to sources that receive the exemption must be made up by sources that 
do not receive the exemption. Therefore no source knows exactly what its allocation will be 
starting in 2007 (Unger 2005). 
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8.2.2 OTC NOx Budget Program 
While the NOx Budget Program can generally be considered a success, it had an 
inauspicious beginning that is evident in the allowance price fluctuations in the first half of 1999. 
Sources in Maryland surprised the market by not participating in the first season. Once it was 
realized these sources would not participate, allowances prices fell because Maryland sources 
were expected to be net buyers of allowances (Farrell 2000).32 There were other delays in the 
adoption of state rules and the timing of their adoption that led to market uncertainty. Fortunately 
this difference across states was only in timing not content, so caused only short-term problems. 
An additional source of market volatility in the early part of the NOx Budget Program 
arose from uncertainty about the effectiveness of the primary strategies for compliance, which 
were load shifting and small operational modifications. The market could anticipate the cost of 
retrofit technology, but the performance of the operational strategies chosen was relatively 
unknown. Eventually it was recognized that operational strategies exceeded performance 
expectations (Farrell 2000). With the resolution of these uncertainties it became apparent that 
there were significantly more allowances than emissions, and prices in the summer of 1999 
dropped substantially. By the end of the 1999 season so many allowances were banked that flow 
control was triggered.  
Over the course of the program market activity was clearly robust as there were many 
transactions between economically unrelated sources and across state lines, suggesting that 
trading provided an opportunity to realize cost savings. However, as it became clear that the NOx 
SIP Call program would replace the NOx Budget Program, the price of allowances fell. Under the 
NOx SIP Call there was a limit of 50,000 tons on allowances that could be allocated based on 
early emission reductions. The share of these early reduction allowances that northeastern states 
could allocate was much lower. As a result, many allowances banked under the NOx Budget 
Program were not converted fully into NOx SIP Call allowances. However, the possibility  
that these allowances could be converted to NOx SIP Call allowances at a discount, and that in 
some states only OTC allowances of later vintage could be converted to SIP Call allowances, 
may explain why the size of the bank actually increased in later years and prices remained well 
above zero.  
                                                 
32 Two utilities initiated a legal challenge the rules implementing the cap-and-trade program in Maryland, thus 
delaying the state’s participation. By 2000, the problem was resolved and the utilities participated in the program. 
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8.2.3 The NOx SIP Call 
Like the OTC NOx Budget Program, the NOx SIP Call experienced a large rise and then 
decline in the allowance price during its first season. The price for 2003 and 2004 allowances 
were fairly even leading up to the 2003 trading season.33 The 2003 allowance price then rose 
from around $5,000 to $8,000, while the 2004 allowance price remained steady. The primary 
reason for the 2003 price increase was not regulatory uncertainty, however. Rather, it was the 
dramatic increase in natural gas prices that occurred during that period. In the Northeast, units 
that can fire both oil and natural gas often switch to natural gas during the ozone season, as it 
emits NOx at a lower rate (Zaborowsky 2004). 
The price of 2003 and 2004 allowances dropped dramatically, to less than $2,000 a ton, 
during the 2003 compliance period in response to unseasonably cool weather and the expectation 
that many allowances would be banked. Zaborowsky (2004) suggests that many firms that were 
to join the program in 2004 had just been allocated that year’s allowances and were looking to 
sell them to raise cash given financial difficulties or to finance recently installed emission control 
equipment. 
The 2004 season was generally uneventful. Although allowance prices moved 
significantly over the year, monthly changes were not particularly dramatic. However, explaining 
market price fluctuations is increasingly difficult given influence of companion markets like 
those for fuel and SO2 allowances and proposed federal rules and regulations. At the end of 
2003, and through the 2004 season, 2004 and 2003 allowances traded at a discount over 2005 
allowances under the influence of flow control. Flow control was not triggered after 2003  
given the large allocation in 2004, but that same large allocation, combined with a shortened 
trading season, led to expectations that flow control would be triggered for 2005. Flow control 
reduces the value of banked allowances compared to the current vintage. These expectations 
were realized and the allowance bank is about 37% of the total 2005 allocation (Evolution 
Markets 2004). 
                                                 
33 The allowance price data described in this section is provided by Evolution Markets: www.evomarkets.com. 
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8.3. Economic Measure of Cost Savings  
8.3.1 RECLAIM 
A cap-and-trade approach is expected to be less costly than a prescriptive approach that 
achieves the same reduction in emissions. Johnson and Pekelney (1996) simulate a variety of 
competing proposals for the RECLAIM program and compare them to the most likely command-
and-control alternative. The authors employ a model that represents the option and behavior of 
market participants that wish to minimize their cost of program compliance. It is linked to both a 
regional general equilibrium model used primarily to capture employment effects and an 
atmospheric model that captures the behavior of emissions in the region. The command-and-
control alternative is based on the SCAQMD’s 1991 Air Quality Management Plan that 
describes specific performance and technology standards for industrial categories and processes 
that RECLAIM was designed to replace.  
Johnson and Pekelney find that the characterization of RECLAIM in their model that was 
most like the actual proposal at the time of their analysis would yield abatement cost about 58% 
less than the cost of the command-and-control option over the first six years of the program, for a 
total savings of $347 million (1987$). It was also shown that the RECLAIM option would likely 
cause less disruption in the labor market than the command-and-control policy. 
8.3.2 Ozone Transport Commission NOx Budget Program 
Farrell et al. (1999) use a dynamic deterministic programming model to predict 
compliance cost of about $1 billion (1996$) for the second phase (1999–2002) of the OTC NOx 
Budget Program. This represents an estimated $900 million in savings over the assumed 
alternative command-and-control approach, which assumes boiler level caps equal to its 
allocation under the cap-and-trade approach. There are no ex post estimates of the total 
abatement cost of the program as it was implemented. However, we expect that the total 
compliance cost was likely lower than the Farrell et al. cap-and-trade estimate because their 
model does not capture the effect of changes in the dispatch of generating capacity or the 
possibility of reducing NOx through small operation modifications. 
The Farrell et al. model predicts a price of $1,331 per ton in 1999, which rises to $1,718 
by 2002 (1996$). The program uncertainty described above kept allowance prices above this 
range until the fall of 1999. Allowance prices eventually fell below these estimates attributable to 
the unexpectedly large number of allowances banked in the first year of the program. As noted 
above, sources realized more low-cost abatement methods through operational modifications 
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than were anticipated. In the later years of the OTC NOx Budget Program, downward pressure on 
allowance prices was further exerted by the limitation on the number of banked allowances that 
could be converted into NOx SIP Call allowances, an outcome that could not have reasonably 
been anticipated by Farrell et al. 
8.3.3 The NOx SIP Call 
Burtraw et al. (2001a) estimate that annual cost of abatement controls to achieve the 
reductions required by the NOx SIP Call program is expected to be $2.1 billion (1997$). 
Assuming that the controls installed for seasonal compliance will be employed annually, they 
find that, using 2008 as an example, the program will reduce annual emissions within the region 
from 3.45 million to 2.43 million tons. The authors also predict that the price of an emissions 
allowance will be $3,401 (1997$). This compares with a predicted allowance price from their 
model of $1,356 for a policy representing the second phase of the OTC NOx Budget Program. 
They do not model an alternative command-and-control approach. 
The SIP Call policy has the additional interest of its influence on electricity costs. 
Burtraw et al (2001a) suggest that the policy will not have a large impact on electricity prices. 
Their model forecasts an average price increase of about 1.1%, from $64.4 to $65.1 per  
MWh (1997$), in 2008 in the SIP Call region. These results are sensitive to their predictions 
regarding the extent of electricity market deregulation, and thus how electricity is priced, in the 
SIP Call region. They assume that slightly more than half of the region’s generation is priced 
under a regulated, as opposed to a market-based, regime. The affect of the SIP Call on the  
price of electricity would presumably be greater if there is greater deregulation of the market 
than they assume.  
As part of its responsibilities when proposing new regulations, EPA also employed an 
electricity sector model to estimate the costs of the NOx SIP Call policy. EPA’s preferred 
analysis of the expected cost of NOx reductions finds that the average cost per ton reduced is 
$1,807 (U.S. EPA, 1998b).34 This study does not provide an estimate of the allowance price. 
U.S. EPA (1998) predicts a change in electricity prices of about 1.6%, assuming market-based 
                                                 
34 The EPA model assumes that controls installed in response to emissions standards under Titles I and IV 
are the only existing controls in the OTR for its analysis; Burtraw et al. (2001) use the OTR trading policy 
and its lower average emissions rates as its starting point. As such, there are fewer low-cost options 
available to affected sources in the Burtraw et al. study than in the EPA analysis. For a description of 
additional differences between the two studies, see Burtraw and Evans, 2004. 
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pricing throughout the electricity sector, and about 1.2% assuming traditional regulated pricing. 
The study does not indicate whether these predicted changes apply just to the SIP Call region or 
to the entire nation, however. 
The primary focus in this discussion is cost, but it is noteworthy that net benefits  
(benefits minus cost) and cost-effectiveness are affected importantly by the limitation of the 
program to summer. Burtraw et al. (2003) examine 18 scenarios reflecting major sources of 
uncertainty in calculating benefits and costs and find that an annual policy would yield net 
benefits that are at least as great as those achieved under a seasonal approach. Some states, 
including New York, New Hampshire, and North Carolina, have recognized the value of 
reducing NOx emissions on an annual basis and have adopted their own cap-and-trade programs 
to address this pollutant (and others).35
All of the estimates provided in this section are limited to compliance costs. As discussed 
above, the economic literature prefers a broader definition of the cost of regulation that includes 
a consideration of the interaction of new regulations or taxes with the effect of preexisting ones. 
None of the studies described above take the effects of tax interaction into account in their 
estimates. Goulder et al. (1999), analyzing a hypothetical NOx cap-and-trade policy, find that 
general equilibrium costs are higher than compliance cost estimates. 
9. Conclusions and Lessons 
We have reviewed a wide range of program features and measures of performance of SO2 
and NOx emissions trading markets in the United States, spanning a large existing literature. 
From this review we distill several conclusions regarding SO2 and NOx emissions trading and we 
offer some conclusions that speak to future regulations of as yet unregulated emissions from 
electricity generators. 
•  Emission cap-and-trade programs have proven to be an effective way to protect 
the environment. In the one exception, problems of NOx emission violations 
(emissions in excess of the cap) visited on the RECLAIM program during the 
California electricity market crisis were also experienced at facilities subject to 
other forms of regulation. 
                                                 
35 For more on state efforts to reduce NOx and SO2 see Palmer and Burtraw (2005) and U.S. EIA (2004). 
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•  Important hotspot effects have not emerged in the SO2 or NOx programs. 
Aggregate emission reductions have been far more important than the geographic 
location of emissions. For the national SO2 and the large regional NOx programs a 
single uniform market has been a wise policy design that expanded the 
opportunity for cost savings without sacrificing environmental gains. 
•  The SO2 and NOx cap-and-trade programs have generated sizable cost savings 
over CAC approaches and there is evidence that they have also induced 
technological improvement. 
•  The allowance markets appear reasonably efficient. But not all of the potential 
cost savings available from trading have been realized.  
•  Seasonal NOx trading programs have done a good job of reducing ozone peaks 
through reductions in baseline NOx emissions, despite the fact that NOx emissions 
caps are not targeted to focus specifically on ozone peaks. An annual cap-and-
trade program for NOx makes sense as a way of generating further reductions in 
emissions to address concerns about particulates and other pollution problems 
such as nitrogen deposition and acid rain. 
•  Allowance banking has been an essential component of the SO2 program. Its 
absence is a costly feature of the NOx programs, eroding the opportunity for cost 
savings from interannual trading and contributing directly to the suspension of 
trading in RECLAIM. 
•  The efficiency of allowance trading would be increased if emission allowances 
were distributed initially through a revenue-raising auction. 
•  The cap-and-trade program is a good model for further reductions in SO2 and NOx 
emissions like those recommended in EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule or in 
proposed federal multipollutant legislation. We would recommend that banking 
be a provision of future programs for SO2 and NOx emission reduction. 
We suggest some important lessons for using the cap-and-trade approach to regulate 
other pollutants.  
•  All of our conclusions regarding the use of cap and trade for SO2 and NOx 
generally hold for CO2. 
•  An important difference between CO2 and the other pollutants is the issue of 
allowance allocation. The costs of CO2 reductions may be much larger than 
  45Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Evans, Krupnick, Palmer, Toth 
previous programs, and inefficiency created by a free distribution may be much 
more significant (Burtraw et al. 2001b).  
•  For a toxic pollutant (and one with nonuniform dispersion properties) such as 
mercury, which EPA is planning to regulate with a final rule scheduled to be 
issued in March 2005, hotspots may be more of a concern and some limits on 
trading may be warranted. 
The cap-and-trade approach to environmental regulation is not one-size-fits-all. Indeed, 
the effect is just the opposite, because this approach gives individual facilities the opportunity to 
tailor compliance activities to minimize cost while achieving society’s environmental goals. 
Moreover, the cap-and-trade approach is not suited to all types of environmental problems. 
However, in the case of air emissions from large sources, cap and trade may now be the default 
approach. One might even reasonably ask: Why not use cap and trade to achieve large reductions 
in aggregate emissions?  
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